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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






WINSTON J. BANKS, 




FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-01889) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 26, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 








 Appellant Winston J. Banks appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 




 On July 12, 2007, Banks filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in 
which he alleged discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and disability.  Specifically, he 
asserted that he had been hired as a “tipstaff” on January 24, 2000 by Judge Glynnis Hill 
of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, First Judicial District.  On October 20, 2006, 
he requested permission to leave early due to a medical condition.  Although he had a 
balance of 40 sick leave days or more, Judge Hill told him that if he left work he would 
be terminated.  Banks, a veteran, went to the Veterans Administration Hospital for 
treatment anyway and was terminated that day.  Banks further asserted that a pregnant 
law clerk had been treated more favorably in that she had been allowed to work from 
home, and that two white male court officers left work before the end of their shifts on a 
number of occasions.   
Banks was issued a right-to-sue letter, and he then filed his first pro se federal 
unlawful discrimination civil action in 2008 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see D.C. Civ. No. 08-cv-03132.  Banks appeared to 
allege only that his termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, 
et seq.  The District Court dismissed the complaint and Banks appealed to this Court.  On 
August 17, 2009, we affirmed, see Banks v. Court of Common Pleas FJD, 342 Fed. 
Appx. 818 (3d Cir. 2009), holding that the Court of Common Pleas, as an instrumentality 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 
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from a suit arising out of its alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the ADA 
and the FMLA.   
Banks then filed a pro se civil action in state court based on the same events.  The 
complaint was dismissed and Banks’ appeal to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
was unsuccessful.    
 On September 21, 2012, Banks filed a second EEOC charge, in which he again 
claimed that his termination was unlawful, and explained that he should have filed his 
original EEOC charge under the Government Employee Rights Act (“GERA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-16c.1
                                              
1 GERA provides that all personnel actions affecting state employees shall be free of any 
discrimination based on race, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability.  See id.  In 
enacting GERA, Congress made the standards of the federal anti-discrimination laws 
applicable to state employees who are appointed to the personal staffs of elected state 
officials.  See Stitz v. City of Eureka Springs, Ark., 9 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1055 (W.D. Ark. 
1998). 
  The EEOC dismissed the charge as untimely filed on January 22, 2013.  
Banks filed a response to the dismissal with the EEOC, and then he returned to federal 
court on April 10, 2013 with the instant pro se civil action, alleging that his termination 
violated GERA’s anti-discrimination provisions.  The defendant Court of Common Pleas, 
First Judicial District, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, contending that judicial review of the EEOC’s decision dismissing the 
GERA charge lies exclusively in the court of appeals.  In an order entered on May 22, 
2013, the District Court, agreeing with the Court of Common Pleas, dismissed Banks’ 
second federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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 Banks appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “When reviewing 
an order dismissing a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we exercise plenary 
review over legal conclusions and review findings of fact for clear error.”  White-Squire 
v. United States Postal Service, 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, it is undisputed 
that Judge Hill is an elected state official, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3131(a).  
Accordingly, Banks appropriately, if tardily, filed his Charge of Discrimination pursuant 
to GERA, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c.   
The question presented by this appeal concerns Banks’ avenue for judicial review 
of the EEOC’s decision dismissing his September 21, 2012 GERA charge.  GERA 
provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by a final order” of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission “may obtain a review of such order under chapter 158 of Title 
28,” or, in other words, review of this agency’s GERA orders lies exclusively in a court 
of appeals.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(c).  See also Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 
802, 808 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Crain v. Butler, 419 F. Supp.2d 785, 788 (E.D.N.C. 
2005) (same).  This provision that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to 
review EEOC orders in GERA cases is a “dramatic departure” from the other anti-
discrimination laws, which, like the ADA, provide for de novo review in a federal district 
court, cf. Kelley, 542 F.3d at 808 n.4 (addressing Title VII).  Accordingly, the District 
Court properly dismissed Banks’ second civil action based on a GERA claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.2
                                              
2 Although Banks did not file an appeal of the EEOC’s decision in this Court within the 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the 
Banks’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Cir. 2004) (“Under chapter 158, there is a 60 – day period to file a petition for review of 
an agency order.”), it appears that the EEOC’s untimeliness determination was 
nonetheless correct in that his September 21, 2012 GERA charge of discrimination was 
not filed within 180 days from the date of his termination on October 20, 2006, see 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(b)(1). 
